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ABSTRACT
We present a model of the Political Budget Cycle in which voters and politicians have preferences
for different types of government spending. Incumbents try to influence voters by changing the
composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may
support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending
may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it can also reflect sincere preference of the
incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are targeted
to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public
finances for all Colombian municipalities. Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in
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It is widely believed that incumbent politicians increase public spending before elections to improve
the chances that they (or their party) will be re-elected. It is not obvious however why such changes
would generate electoral beneﬁts if voters are rational. Rational individuals should vote on the basis
of the policies they expect each candidate will undertake after the election, rather than on past
outcomes. Furthermore, they should anticipate eventual incentives of the incumbent to manipulate
ﬁscal policy before an election, and therefore not respond to such manipulation.
To reconcile ﬁscal expansions before elections with voter rationality, Rogoﬀ (1990) and Rogoﬀ
and Sibert (1988) suggested that high pre-election expenditures that are visible to voters may serve
as a signal of “competence”, meaning the ability to provide more public goods. A politician has
private information about his own level of competence, which exhibits some persistence over time.
Voters face a signal extraction problem: they cannot observe competence directly and therefore use
spending on some types of goods before an election to infer post-electoral competence. As a result,
an incumbent running for re-election has an incentive to increase spending in those items voters
observe. For instance, while in Rogoﬀ (1990) voters observe some types of government expenditure,
in Shi and Svensson (2002) they observe the overall level of spending, but not all voters observe
the deﬁcit. In this approach, a ﬁscal expansion before an election can be an eﬀective tool to gain
support from imperfectly informed voters.
However, the view that increasing aggregate spending or deﬁcits before an election is an eﬀective
tool to gain votes has been questioned. Peltzman (1992) shows that voters in the US are less likely to
support a local oﬃcial who has increased overall spending before the election. Brender (2003) ﬁnds
evidence that, when voters in Israel are able to eﬀectively monitor the ﬁscal choices of local oﬃcials,
incurring in large pre-election deﬁcits actually harms an incumbent’s chances of being re-elected.
Brender and Drazen (2005) ﬁnd in a large panel of countries that deﬁcits over the previous three
years reduce an incumbent’s re-election chances in developed countries and established democracies.
Similarly, our ﬁndings below indicate that the share of votes received by the incumbent’s party is
decreasing in the level of the deﬁcit in the year preceding the election. It would therefore appear
that well informed voters not only are hard to “buy” through spending increases, they are actually
averse to high overall government spending and deﬁcits.
Politicians appear to be aware of this. Brender and Drazen (2004) show that empirical results
1suggesting that election-year increases in spending or deﬁcits are a widespread phenomenon (see Shi
and Svensson [2002a, 2002b] and Persson and Tabellini [2003]) are driven by the experience of “new”
democracies, that is, by the ﬁrst few elections in countries that have made the transition to democ-
racy.1 Once new democracies are removed from a larger sample, no statistically signiﬁcant political
deﬁcit cycle is found among established democracies. One is left with the question of whether there
is room for electoral manipulation of the budget in established democracies, characterized by well
informed and sophisticated voters.
We therefore suggest a diﬀerent approach, where political budget cycles emerge even if voters
dislike high government expenditure and budget deﬁcits, and even if they are able (unlike the models
in the Rogoﬀ tradition) to perfectly observe ﬁscal policy. Political manipulation takes the form of
changing the composition of government spending, allowing its overall level (and the deﬁcit) to
remain unchanged. Voters value some goods more than others, so that an opportunistic politician
may be induced to shift the composition of pre-election spending towards these goods. What voters
want to infer is then whether a politician’s preferences over the composition of the budget are actually
close to their own or whether his pre-election spending choices are meant simply to gain votes. This
would explain why there is an incentive for incumbents to increase some types of spending, even
if voters are “ﬁscal conservatives” in the sense of being averse to large overall levels of government
spending. Electoral manipulation arises even with fully rational voters, given that they must try
to infer the incumbent’s preferences from his ﬁscal behavior. Voters thus rationally respond to
pre-election increases in their most preferred types of spending.2
The strength of the political cycle in our model depends on the distribution of ideological prefer-
ences, and on the amount of information voters have about the political environment. As is probably
not surprising, targeted spending increases more prior to elections the larger is the fraction of swing
voters in the electorate. However, in our model voters anticipate this behavior. As a result, when
a large fraction of voters is undecided, high levels of targeted spending are recognized as being
politically motivated, rather than being interpreted as an eﬀective signal of the politician’s ﬁscal
1Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) ﬁnd an electoral expenditure cycle in regional elections in Russia after its
transition to democracy, which becomes smaller with each new round of regional elections.
2Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) present formal models of balanced-budget targeting
of voter groups, but these models assume that a politician can commit himself to a post-electoral ﬁscal policy. There
is no voter inference problem about post-electoral utility based on pre-electoral economic magnitudes, so the question
of why rational, forward-looking voters who are targeted before the election vote for the incumbent is not really
answered.
2preferences. This creates a natural limit to electorally motivated increases in spending. On the
other hand, the incumbent’s ability to engage in this form of electoral manipulation is increased by
its access to privileged information about the political environment. In particular, politicians in our
model may have more information than voters about the potential electoral beneﬁts of increasing
targeted expenditures (i.e. how “swing” voters are). This increases their ability to obtain politi-
cal support from increases in targeted expenditures, as voters cannot determine if the targeting is
politically motivated.
In a related paper (Drazen and Eslava [2005]), we develop a model where expenditures can be
targeted to diﬀerent groups with heterogeneous preferences, and politicians have preferences over
diﬀerent interest groups. As a result, before elections the composition of expenditures is tilted
towards the goods favored by groups with greater electoral importance. The incumbent’s privileged
information about the relative electoral impact of targeting one group or another gives him the
ability to raise votes from targeting those groups with spending, even though all voters are aware of
the electoral incentives he faces.
We present empirical evidence below on these electoral composition eﬀects, using a new data
s e tw ec o m p i l e do nl o c a lg o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n ga n dl o c al elections for all Colombian municipalities.
Obviously, a classiﬁcation of government expenditure into targeted and non-targeted expenditures
is not readily available, or straightforward. In fact, all government expenditures (probably with the
exception of interest payments on external debt) generate beneﬁts for at least some groups in society,
even if it is only to those individuals who provide the services and goods to the government. However,
we argue that some of the components of expenditure that local governments report separately — in
C o l o m b i ai np a r t i c u l a r ,m o s tc a t e g o r i e so fi n v e s t m e n te x p e n d i t u r e s—a r em o r el i k e l yt or e ﬂect what
we call targeted expenditures than others. Consistent with our model, we ﬁnd that most categories
of investment of spending show pre-election expansions, while many components of current spending
contract. Furthermore, we investigate the eﬀect of pre-election ﬁscal policy on the share of votes
received by the incumbent party. We ﬁnd evidence that voters reward incumbents who increase
investment spending, but only to the extent that they do so without running large election-year
deﬁcits.
Our results on electoral composition eﬀects are consistent with some previous ﬁndings. Brender
(2003) ﬁnds that voters in Israel penalize election year deﬁcits, but also that they reward high expen-
3diture in development projects in the year previous to an election. Similarly, Peltzman (1992) result
that US voters punish government spending holds for current (as opposed to capital) expenditures,
but is weaker if investment in roads, an important component of public investment, is included in
his policy variable.3 Similarly, Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) argue that in the OECD there is
no evidence of a systematic electoral penalty or fall in popularity for governments that enact policies
of signiﬁcant ﬁscal restraint. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) look for evidence of a political budget
cycle for Canadian provinces, and ﬁnd no evidence of a cycle in aggregate spending, but do ﬁnd a
cycle in what they call “visible expenditures”, mostly investment expenditures such as construction
of roads and structures. Very similar ﬁndings are reported for Mexico by Gonzalez (2002), who also
ﬁnds that other categories of spending, such as current transfers, contract prior to elections. Sur-
prisingly, these regularities, as well as their potential implications for the theory of political budget
cycles, seem to have gone overlooked.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and solve for the political-
economic equilibrium with a budget composition cycle. In section 3 we discuss relevant empirical
evidence for the case of Colombia. Section 4 contains conclusions.
2 A Simple Model
We present a simple two-period model, with an election between an incumbent and a challenger at
the end of the ﬁrst period, where incumbents use the composition of expenditures to attract votes.
We make extreme assumptions about the distribution of politician types and the distribution of
voter preferences, the two key “primitives” of the problem, in order to derive the main results as
simply as possible. The political budget cycle is represented simply as the diﬀerence in ﬁscal choices
between the pre-election period and the post-election period. Our results, however, do not depend
on the simplicity of the assumptions on the distributions or the existence of only one election cycle.4
Voters value certain types of expenditures, but dislike deﬁcits. We simply assume that incumbents
can neither change the overall level of spending, taxes, or deﬁcits, reﬂecting the aversion of voters
3He interprets the “odd ﬁndings” obtained when including expenditure in roads as a result of the high lumpiness
of this component. However, in light of the other evidence reviewed here, we view them as the reﬂection that voters
in fact support the undertaking of development projects.
4In Drazen and Eslava (2005) we develop a more elaborate model with multiple elections and less restrictive
assumptions about the distributions. The focus is groups with diﬀerent ﬁscal preferences, rather than on voters who
all have the same preferences. The conceptual results we show below also hold in such type of framework.
4to high overall spending and deﬁcits. Targeting voters with one type of spending requires reducing
a n o t h e rt y p e ,w h e r ew ef o c u so ns u c ht a r g e t i n g .T h ec h o i c eo fﬁs c a lp o l i c yi st h u st h ec o m p o s i t i o n
of the budget.
The incumbent politician has preferences over the composition of the budget which may diﬀer
from those of voters. For simplicity, we assume that all voters have the same preferences over
types of expenditure and receive the same amount of goods, so the heterogeneity of interest over
the budget is between voters and politicians, rather than across groups of voters, as in Drazen and
Eslava (2005). Here, voters diﬀer from one another only in their preferences over policies other than
targeted expenditures (termed “ideology”).
2.1 Voters
An voter trades oﬀ ideology over non-ﬁscal policy, π, and utility from targeted expenditures, gt,
in deciding whether to support a candidate. The idea of targeted expenditures is close to that in
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) or Dixit and Londregan (1996), but in a setting where expectations of
future policy are key to determining how an individual votes. (See footnote 2.)
Utility of an individual depends on two factors, each of which may be inﬂuenced by government
policy. First, there is the consumption of the government supplied good gt ≥ 0 which provides utility
directly. (We abstract here from private consumption, since taxes are ﬁxed.) Second, an individual
j also cares about the distance between his most desired position ˜ πj over non-ﬁscal policies (which
is immutable) and the positions πI of the current incumbent I and πC of the challenger. We take
these as ﬁxed and, without loss of generality, assume πI <π C. In the post-election period, either
the initial incumbent I or the challenger C may be in power, depending on the election outcome.















where V 0 (·) > 0, V 00 (·) < 0,a n dgP
t is expenditure chosen by policymaker P.A v o t e r j is thus
characterized by ˜ πj. (To help in following the exposition, note that V (gP
t ) does not depend on j.
Hence in discussing the problem of inferring g2 from g1,w em a yi g n o r et h ei n d e xj.)
An individual’s only decision is whether to vote for the incumbent or the challenger, and only in
an election period. We therefore focus on utility as of period 1, when the election takes place. The








where β is the discount factor, and P ∈ {I,C}. In the election, a voter prefers the incumbent over
the challenger if he expects to receive more utility from the former in t =2 .
2.2 Politicians
There are two government provided goods: gt;a n dKt, a good which the politician values but which
voters do not. One may think, for example, of politicians who value managing a large bureaucracy.
(For simplicity of exposition we call Kt “desks”.) However, the idea we have in mind is more general:
voters may value some government services less than others for many reasons, such as voters’ failure
to recognize the positive externalities these services produce, or the low visibility of some types of
expenditure. The characterization of Kt a st o t a lw a s t ei nt h ee y e so fv o t e r si ss i m p l ya ne x t r e m ew a y
to capture those diﬀerences in the value assigned by voters to diﬀerent goods and services provided
by the government. Each period, the government thus faces a budget constraint:
T = Kt + gt (3)
where T is a ﬁxed and exogenous level of tax revenue.
The politician’s objective is to maximize a weighted sum of voters’ utility, a ﬁxed value χ of
being in oﬃce, and the value of “desks” Kt. W ed e n o t eb yωPt t h ew e i g h tap o l i t i c i a nP puts on














where N is the size of the voting population, which we assume to be constant and a(K) is an
increasing, concave function. We have written this objective in per-capita terms for simplicity.
The weight ωPt, known to the politician but not observed by voters, is crucial to a voter’s choice.
The level of g2 the politician would choose is, by (4), known to be a function of ωP2, so that rational
voters vote on the basis of their beliefs about ωI2 and ωC2. The crucial assumptions in our argument
6that election-year ﬁscal policy may be used to gain votes are that the weight the politician puts on
voters’ utility is not observed by the voters (and hence must be inferred), but is correlated over time
(so that ﬁscal policy observed before the election provides information on the politician’s preferences
and hence spending allocation in the post-election period). Voters must try to infer the value of ωI2
from observations on g1, that is, on expenditures before the election. For clarity of exposition, we
assume the process governing the evolution of the ωPt takes the simplest possible form that satisﬁes
the conditions discussed above. First, ωPtdoes not change from t =1to t =2 ,w i t hωP1 = ωP2 ≡ ωP
for P ∈ {I,C}.5 Second, for any politician P, ωP c a nt a k eo nt w ov a l u e s :ωP = {ω,ω} with prior
probabilities Pr(ω = ω)=¯ p and Pr(ω = ω)=( 1− ¯ p).W es u p p o s eω>ω , so that a politician of
type ω cares more about targeting expenditures to people (a people politician), while ωP = ω makes
the politician more interested in bureaucracy than targeting (a desks politician).
In the election year, the incumbent chooses g1 trying to maximize his lifetime utility. Abstracting






















where β is a discount factor and ρ is the probability of re-election which, given that voters use g1 to
make inferences the incumbent’s preferences, is a function of g1. We will solve for the function ρ(·)
from voter’s behavior, assuming voters are forward looking. Note that, since ideological positions of
both voters and candidates are given, the argument that relates to ideology is a constant in both
periods.
One solves the problem backwards, starting with the post-election period. In t =2 ,ag o v e r n m e n t
P (P = I,C)m a x i m i z e s( 4 )b yc h o i c eo fgP
2 subject to the budget constraint (3). The solution is














for each P, that is, the politician equalizes his marginal utility from the two uses of expenditure.
Concavity of V (g) and a(K) implies that the postelection targeted expenditures to voters are
5In a multiperiod model, this assumption needs to be modiﬁed so that ωP1 cannot be perfectly inferred from
previous policy. An alternative that satisﬁes this requirement is that ωPt follows an MA(1) process, analogous to the
evolution of competence in Rogoﬀ (1990).
7increasing in the weight the politician gives to voter welfare, so that g2(ω) >g 2(ω). We will denote
g2(ω)=g, and suppose for simplicity that ω = ∞,s ot h a ta“ people-type” politician always chooses
the maximum level of expenditures possible, that is, g2(ω)=T>g . This assumption simpliﬁes the
solution but, as we discuss later, we could dispense of it and still prove that politicians are expected
to engage in pre-election increases in targeted expenditures.
In the election period, the incumbent chooses g1 to maximize his objective (5), subject to the
budget constraint (3). A politician may then choose a value of g1 diﬀe r e n tf r o mw h a th ew o u l d
choose in the non-election period, if by doing so he can signiﬁcantly increase his chances of being
reelected, represented by ρ. Given our assumption that ω = ∞,apeople politician would provide
the maximum possible gt even in the non-election period, so he would not change his policy in
the election period. A desks policymaker (one characterized by ω), however, has two choices. He
may choose g1(ω)=g, his non-election period optimum, but thus reveal his type. Or, he may
choose g1(ω)=T>gto inﬂuence the election outcome by mimicking a people policymaker, whom
voters prefer given that g2 is increasing in ω.6 He will choose high g if the current utility beneﬁtf r o m
choosing his non-electoral preferred policy (low g) is smaller than the beneﬁt derived from increasing
his re-election chances through high targeted expenditures. More formally, the desks-type incumbent







(∆Ω¯ p + χ) (7)
where ∆Ω is the current utility gain to a policy maker of ω type of choosing his own policy:
∆Ω ≡ ω
£




a(T − g) − a(0)
¤
> 0
Note that the beneﬁt from choosing high g in t =1 , given by the right-hand side of (7), depends




, and the value of being re-elected. The
latter includes not only the exogenous value of being in oﬃce, but also the value of having one’s
preferred policy in t =2rather than the challenger’s, which is non-zero only if the challenger is of
ad i ﬀerent type. This explains the presence of ¯ p =P r ( ωP = ω) in condition (7).
The following lemma summarizes the incumbent’s behavior, where a type ω incumbent may
6Since any choice of g1 other than T will reveal a policymaker to be of type ω, in a separating equilibrium he will
choose g.
8either pool with a type ω or separate from him:
Lemma 1:( Incumbent’s Strategy)
In the election period, the incumbent’s optimal choice of targeted expenditures g1(ωI) is characterized











(∆Ω¯ p + χ)
g otherwise
¾
2.3 Voting behavior and election outcomes
We now consider the choice problem of voters. Let E [V (g2) | P,g1] be the voter’s expectation of
his utility from government expenditures in t =2if politician P is elected at the end of t =1 ,
conditional on observed g1. He votes for the incumbent if he expects to receive higher utility in
t =2under the incumbent than the challenger. That is, voter j votes for the incumbent if
E
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where πI and πC a r ek n o w n ,a si sg2 (ω) for ω =( ω,ω). However, j has imperfect information about
both ωI and ωC. To infer the challenger’s position, he has no other information than the ex-ante
distribution of ω, summarized by the prior Pr(ωC = ω)=¯ p. On the other hand, voters can use the
realization of g1 to update their information about the incumbent’s type. Using Bayes’ rule and the
prior ¯ p, voters form a posterior on ω,d e n o t e d¯ p1, according to:
¯ p1(g
I








Equation (9) captures the rationality of voting in response to election year ﬁscal policy. Speciﬁcally,
since voters know a people type politician never chooses low expenditures (Pr(g1 = g | ω = ω)=0 ),









¯ p +( 1− ¯ p)q
(10)
where q =P r ( g1 = T | ω = ω) ≤ 1 is the probability that a desk-type politician will choose g1 = T
in the election period. Note the obvious characteristic of Bayesian updating: ¯ p1(gI
1 = T) > ¯ p iﬀ
q<1;i fq =1 ,t h e n¯ p1(T)=¯ p.
The nature of voters’ posterior beliefs reﬂects an essential characteristic of the political equilib-
rium. A politician provides high election year expenditures favored by voters in order to convince
them that he would also choose high targeted expenditures after the election. However, this signal
is only eﬀective to in aﬀecting voters’ perceptions if this political incentive is not so large that any
politician would provide high electoral expenditures, no matter what his post-election preferences
will be. Formally, setting gI
1 = T has no eﬀect on voting if q =1 .
We can now rewrite the condition under which voter j prefers the incumbent over the challenger,
condition (8), as:
(¯ p1(g1) − ¯ p)
£









where the left hand side represents the expected gain in utility from consumption if the incumbent
is reelected, and the right hand side represents the expected loss in utility from ideological issues if
reelection occurs.
To illustrate, we consider the following simple example of voters’ ideological preferences. Voters
may hold one of three ideological positions: ˜ πj = {ˆ π
I, ˆ π
M = πI+πC
2 , ˆ π
C}.V o t e r sw i t h˜ πj =ˆ π
I are
the incumbent’s core voters: they are suﬃciently left of center that they vote for the incumbent
even if he is known to be of the desks type, that is, even if ¯ p1 =0 . Analogously, voters with ˜ πj =ˆ π
C
are the challenger’s core voters: they are suﬃciently right of center that they vote for the challenger
even if the incumbent is known to be of the people type.7 I nt h em i d d l ea r ev o t e r sw i t h˜ πj =ˆ π
M,
swing voters in that they are ideologically as close to one candidate as they are to the other. They















+( 1− ¯ p)
·
V (T) − V (g)
2(πC − πI)
¸
10therefore vote on the basis of the ﬁscal policy they expect to see from the candidates. They vote
for the incumbent if and only if they believe he is more likely than the challenger to have high
ω,t h a ti s ,i ﬀ ¯ p1(gI
1) > ¯ p.( I f¯ p1(gI
1)=¯ p, swing voters are indiﬀerent between the two candidates,
and vote to reelect the incumbent with some probability r, which will be analyzed in section 2.4,
where we study the equilibrium.8 The crucial point is that swing voters may be led to vote for the
incumbent by high pre-election targeted expenditure, since they assign some probability to the event
that targeting reﬂects high preference of the incumbent for targeted spending, rather than purely
electoral motives.
We summarize the behavior of voters in:
Lemma 2:( Voting Strategies)
In an election between the incumbent and a challenger, the optimal voting strategy of an individual
j is given by:
1) If e π
j =ˆ π
I individual j votes for the incumbent with probability 1
2) If e π
j =ˆ π
C individual j votes for the challenger with probability 1
3) If e π
j =ˆ π
M ≡ πC+πI
2 individual j votes for the incumbent with probability r(g1), where
r(gt)=1 if ¯ p1(g1) > ¯ p
r(gt) ∈ [0,1] if ¯ p1(g1)=¯ p
r(gt)=0 if ¯ p1(g1) < ¯ p
where ¯ p1(g1) is derived from Bayes’ rule, so that ¯ p1(g)=0 ,a n d¯ p1(T)=
¯ p
¯ p+(1−¯ p)q.
Given the voting strategies in lemma 2, election outcomes are easy to characterize. Let φI, φC,
and φM be the fraction of voters with ˜ πj equal to ˆ π
I, ˆ π
C, and ˆ π
M, respectively. The election is
decided by simple majority rule.9 The incumbent obtains φI of the votes if ¯ p1 < ¯ p, φI + rφM if
¯ p1 =¯ p,a n dφI +φM of the votes otherwise. In other words, the incumbent is re-elected if ¯ p1 > ¯ p or
if ¯ p1 =¯ p and φI + rφM ≥ 1
2. For the time being, we assume that both voters and politicians have
perfect information about φI, φM,a n dφC. We further assume that neither group of core voters
constitute an absolute majority (that is, φI < 1
2 and φC < 1
2), meaning no candidate can win the
election without getting the votes of at least some swing voters, and a candidate supported by all
8These assumptions about ideological preferences are a simple way to capture only some voters being inﬂuenced
by ﬁscal policy, while others have such strong positions on other issues that pay no attention to this dimension. By
dividing the population in these three groups we simplify things by having each voter worry only about one policy
dimension.
9We assume, without loss of generality, that a tie is resolved in favor of the incumbent.
11swing voters wins the election for sure.
The assumption that no group of core voters is a majority implies that an incumbent who
chooses low pre-election targeted spending will not be reelected, since voters recognize him as being





=0 . If the incumbent chooses gI
1 = T and q =1(a desks-
type incumbent chooses g1 = T with certainty), then swing voters are indiﬀerent between the two
candidates (¯ p1(gI
1)=¯ p). Then, ρ(T)=1if and only if φI + r(gI
1)φM ≥ 1
2, that is, if indiﬀerent
voters choose the incumbent with high enough probability, and there are enough swing voters. On
the other hand , if gI
1 = T and q<1,t h e n¯ p1(gI
1) > ¯ p, then swing voters strictly prefer the incumbent
and ρ(T)=1 ,s i n c eφI + φM > 1
2.
2.4 Political-economic equilibrium
We can now characterize possible political-economic equilibria. The equilibrium concept is Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium. A pair of strategies (for the incumbent and voters) is an equilibrium if: 1) the
voter’s strategy is optimal given his beliefs and the incumbent’s strategy in choosing g1, where beliefs
are formed according to Bayes’ rule (that is, his strategy satisﬁes lemma 2); and 2) the incumbent’s
choice of g1 is optimal given voting behavior and the implied election outcomes (that is, it satisﬁes
lemma 1).
Given our assumptions, the strategies of a people-type incumbent (ω = ω)a n do fb o t ht y p e s
of core voters (πj =ˆ π
I, ˆ π
C) are trivial. We therefore discuss only the strategies of a desks-type
incumbent (ω = ω) and a swing voter (πj = πM). The strategies in lemmas 1 and 2 imply that
there are only three possible types of equilibria:
Pooling Equilibrium: A desks-type incumbent chooses g1 = T with probability q =1 ,a n d




φM if g1 = T
0 otherwise
¾
.N o t e t h a t
there do not exist pooling equilibria with r(g1 = T) <
1/2−φI
φM , since then a desks-type incumbent
would be better oﬀ deviating to Pr(g1 = T)=0 .
Separating Equilibrium: A desks-type incumbent chooses g1 = T with probability q =0and
s w i n gv o t e r sv o t ef o rt h ei n c u m b e n ti fa n do n l yi fgt = T.
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium: A desks-type incumbent chooses g1 = T with probability
q ∈ (0,1) and swing voters vote for the incumbent if and only if gt = T.
These three sets of strategies indeed constitute equilibria, since no player wants to deviate from
12his strategy, given the other’s strategy.
Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium outcomes depending on whether a desks politician gives
higher value to re-election or to using part of the budget to provide desks rather than expenditure
favored by voters (that is, whether β(p∆Ω + χ) is greater than or less than ∆Ω, the current utility
gain to a policy maker of ω type of choosing his own policy). As above, the Proposition focuses on
the case where swing voters shift the outcome of the election.
Proposition 1 (Political-Economic Equilibrium)
When neither type of core voter constitutes an absolute majority, there are three possible political-
economic equilibria, depending on parameter values:
Case 1) If β(p∆Ω + χ) > ∆Ω, the optimal strategy for a desks-type incumbent (ω = ω)i s





φM if g1 = T
0 otherwise
¾
Case 2) If β(p∆Ω+χ)=∆Ω, the optimal strategy for the desks-type incumbent is Pr(g1 = T)=
q ∈ [0,1). The optimal strategy for swing voters is r(g1)=
½
1 if g1 = T
0 otherwise
¾
Case 3) If β(p∆Ω+χ) < ∆Ω, the optimal strategy for the desks-type incumbent is Pr(g1 = T)=0 .
The optimal strategy for swing voters is r(g1)=
½




Proof: Note ﬁrst that all of these sets of strategies constitute equilibria, since given the voters’
strategy the incumbent’s satisﬁes Lemma 1, and given the incumbent’s strategy the voters’ satisﬁes
Lemma 2. Second, to prove that in each case only the type of equilibrium described exists, note that
a separating (pooling) equilibrium cannot be supported if β(p∆Ω + χ) > ∆Ω (< ∆Ω) because the
incumbent would deviate to gt(ω)=T (gt(ω)=g). Moreover, an equilibrium where the incumbent
plays mixed strategies can only exist if he is indiﬀerent between the two policies, which happens iﬀ
β(p∆Ω + χ)=∆Ω. ¤
Proposition 1 implies that, provided re-election is valuable enough, a political budget cycle will
exist in which: 1) expenditures targeted to voters are expected to be higher in an election than a
non—election period (the actual level will depend on which type of politician is in oﬃce); and 2)
(swing) voters will rationally vote for an incumbent who provides higher targeted expenditures even
though they know that such expenditures may be electorally motivated.
13Speciﬁcally, the proposition shows that if re-election is valuable enough, a desks-type incumbent
will choose g1 = T with some positive probability in an election period, while in the post-election
period, he chooses g2 = g with certainty. This implies that the unconditional expectation of govern-
ment expenditure targeted to voters is higher in the pre-election period, compared to the expected
value for other periods.10 Conversely, non-targeted expenditures are expected to be lower prior to
an election than in other periods. In other words, ﬁscal policy exhibits cycles with the timing of
the election. These cycles take the form of a change in the composition of expenditures, which shift
towards targeted expenditures in election periods.
Of course, a political budget cycle of this form will only appear if the incentives to inﬂuence the
election are large enough. There are two parts to this requirement. The ﬁrst refers to the preferences
of politicians: electoral manipulation of the budget will only arise if β(p∆Ω + χ) ≥ ∆Ω,s ot h a t
the incumbent assigns a large value to being reelected. There is, however, an additional necessary
condition, namely that swing voters (those whose votes depend on ﬁscal policy) can change the
outcome of the election (φI + φM ≥ 1
2). The existence of a political budget cycle therefore depends
on the political environment, in particular in the potential electoral beneﬁt from convincing swing
voters of supporting the incumbent.
What is interesting about the apparently obvious condition on the need for a large fraction of
impressionable voters is that, given rational behavior of voters in the model, ﬁscal manipulation is less
eﬀective to “buy” the vote of any single individual precisely in the cases where there are more swing
voters. In this simpliﬁed setting, where our assumptions imply that the probability of re-election
ρ(g1) is either 0 or 1, this is reﬂected in the fact that ¯ p1(T | φI+φM < 1
2)=1≥ ¯ p1(T | φI+φM ≥ 1
2).
Note further that the assumption that ω = ∞ (and the implication that a ﬁscal expansion in an
election year reﬂects mimicking by the ω politician, whom voters would not prefer if his type were
known) is a convenient modeling device, rather than essential to the existence of the political cycle.
Were ω<∞, a cycle might take the form of signaling, in that the ω type would choose g in both
election and non-election periods, while the ω type would choose g1 just high enough to separate
himself in an election period. If this is higher than the g2 he would choose in a non-election period,
we have the same type of cycle qualitatively. This latter strategy is the one chosen by Rogoﬀ (1990),
in a model of signaling of competence. Rogoﬀ’s approach has been criticized (unfairly, we think)
10The unconditional expectation value of targeted expenditure is given by E(g1)=T [¯ p +( 1− ¯ p)Pr(g1 = T | ω)]+
g(1 − ¯ p)Pr(g1 = g | ω) in an election period, and E(g2)=T ¯ p + g(1 − ¯ p) in non-election period.
14in that it is the more competent candidate the one who engages in ﬁscal manipulation. One could
model the competence problem as one where the less competent may want to mimic the other type,
implying that the less desirable candidate is the one who engages in ﬁscal manipulation.
2.5 Asymmetric information about the electoral environment
So far, we have assumed φI, φM,a n dφC are common knowledge, in that the distribution of voter
types is known both to voters and politicians. This assumption is clearly not realistic, as the electoral
eﬀectiveness of providing targeted spending to voters is not known with certainty, and candidates
frequently have better information about it than the public does. We now relax this assumption, and
show that the existence of asymmetric information about the political environment reinforces the
incentives faced by incumbent oﬃcials to aﬀect election outcomes through changes in ﬁscal policy.
Introducing asymmetric information about political characteristics of voters will also eliminate the
unsatisfactory feature that in some of the equilibria with electorally-motivated expenditures (more
exactly in the pooling equilibrium), voters are indiﬀerent between the challenger and the incumbent
who targets them with spending. This is of course a result of our simplifying assumptions, so we
do not take it as a prediction of the model that voters will strictly be indiﬀerent. However, it does
open the question of how do individuals actually vote when they are “indiﬀerent”, since one would
not expect them to simply toss a coin to deﬁne which candidate to support.
We now assume that candidates running for election know more than voters about the eﬀective-
ness of targeted expenditures to generate votes. In our simple setting, we can account for this type
of information asymmetry by assuming that the shares of core and swing voters are only known to
the politician. In particular, we assume that voters assign a probability z that φC < 1
2. In other
words, voters assign a probability 1 − z t h a tt h ec h a l l e n g e r ’ sc o r ev o t e r sa r eam a j o r i t y ,i nw h i c h
case a desks-type incumbent would have no incentive to choose g1 = T.
Voters now characterize the incumbent’s behavior by




since in the event the politician is of the desks-type (with associated prior probability 1 − ¯ p), he
would choose g1 = T only if φC < 1
2, which happens with probability z. After observing ﬁscal policy,
voters update their beliefs about the incumbent’s type following Bayes’ rule, as captured by equation
15(9). Their posterior beliefs on the probability that a policymaker who chooses high expenditures is
of the high type are now:
¯ p1(g1 = T) ≡ Pr(ω = ω | g1 = T)=
¯ p
¯ p + z(1 − ¯ p)Pr(g1 | ω = ω,φ C < 1
2)
(12)
Given z<1 ,i ti sn o wt h ec a s et h a t¯ p1(g1 = T) > ¯ p even if Pr(g1|ω = ω,φ C < 1
2)=1 .
That is, the incumbent can lead swing voters to prefer him over the challenger by choosing high
targeted expenditures, even if a desks-type politician is as likely to choose high election-year targeted
expenditures as a people-type politicians whenever φC < 1
2. The reason is simply that voters do not
know whether the latter holds.
The equilibria for this case are described in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 (Asymmetric Information about Voter’s Preferences) In equilibrium, the optimal
strategy for a swing voter is to vote for the incumbent with probability r(g1)=
½




optimal strategy for the desks-type incumbent is Pr(gt = T | φC)=q(φC).I fφC ≥ 1
2 then q(φC)=0 .
If φC < 1
2 then q(φC)
½ =1if β(¯ p∆Ω + χ) > ∆Ω
=0if β(¯ p∆Ω + χ) < ∆Ω
∈ [0,1) if β(¯ p∆Ω + χ)=∆Ω
¾
.
This type of imperfect information makes the problem more interesting, by capturing an addi-
tional inference problem for voters. Voters need to make inferences about whether they are being
targeted with spending because the politician prefers such expenditures, or because they are very ef-
f e c t i v et og e tv o t e s .T h ef a c tt h a tt h e ya s s i g ns o m ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h el a t t e ri sn o tt r u eg i v e sm o r e
room for the politician to inﬂuence the outcome of elections by providing more targeted expenditures
prior to elections.
3 Some Empirical Evidence: Local Finances in Colombia
In this section, we present empirical evidence supporting the ideas presented in section 2. The
model has two basic predictions. Lemma 1 states that ﬁscal manipulation may take the form
of changes in the composition of spending when voters are averse to deﬁcits. Our data oﬀer a
higher level of disaggregation than earlier studies, allowing a closer look at the composition issue.
Moreover, the conceptual framework provided by our model facilitates a more systematic analysis
16of the diﬀerent categories of spending. Lemma 2 considers the response of voters to pre-election
changes in budget composition. Hence, we present empirical evidence not only on how elections
aﬀect budget composition, but also on how vote shares respond to these changes.
3.1 The pre-election composition of government expenditure
We concentrate ﬁrst on the election-year changes in ﬁscal policy. The model indicates that targeted
spending should rise preceding an election, while other types of spending should contract. We
therefore try to ﬁnd evidence of pre-election increases in categories of expenditure that most likely
reﬂect targeted spending, accompanied by contractions in other categories.
The diﬀerence between targeted and non-targeted spending is obviously hard to identify in the
data. However, opportunistic targeted expenditures, often known as pork barrel spending, are
most often associated in Colombia with infrastructure development projects: construction of roads,
schools, water plants. Projects of this type are highly visible and beneﬁts p e c i ﬁc (yet potentially
large) groups of voters. On the other hand, some current expenditures, such as purchases of supplies
and services, payments to other government agencies, and debt service, can be presumably cut
without visibly hurting large groups of voters. Hence, given the predictions of our model, we would
expect pre-election increases in those categories of spending that capture development projects, and
cuts in at least some categories of current spending.
Testing these hypotheses requires data on diﬀerent types of government expenditures, covering
observations in both election and non-election years. We compiled a panel of data on government
accounts and electoral outcomes for all municipalities in Colombia (close to 1100 cross-sectional
units) over the period 1987 to 2000. A unique feature of our data compared to those used in previous
studies is the high level of disaggregation of expenditures, allowing us to distinguish diﬀerent types
of spending. From the point of view of the study of ﬁscal policy in Colombia, the data are also novel
in incorporating electoral outcomes. A much more detail description of the data can be found in
Eslava (2004).
We choose this “cross-district” approach in a single country, rather than the more usual cross-
country strategy for two reasons. First, the political budget cycle eﬀe c t sw ep r o p o s ea r em o s tr e l e v a n t
at the local level, where spending can be targeted most eﬃciently. Second, the cross sectional
variability of institutions is much harder to take into account in a multi-country setting than it is
17for cross sectional units within the same country. Constitutional rules, national laws, electoral and
judicial systems, monetary policy, are all important determinants of the existence and strength of
political budget cycles. These characteristics vary far more across countries than in districts within
the same country, which share all of the above-mentioned institutional characteristics.11
Though the direct re-election of incumbent executive oﬃcials is banned in Colombia, electoral
manipulation of ﬁscal policy is regarded as a usual political practice. Political budget cycles are
thought to arise in Colombia largely due to the actions of the legislative bodies, whose members
are in fact subject of direct re-election (in the case of city councils), or at least have found ways to
circumvent formal restrictions to run for direct re-election (as in the national Congress). Moreover,
there are two reasons why an incumbent mayor who cannot run for re-election has incentives to
manipulate ﬁscal policy at the end of his term of oﬃce. First, an incumbent knows that his decisions
aﬀect his party’s re-election chances (or those of the incumbent’s preferred candidate). Second,
oﬃcials usually run for election to other posts in later years, or for re-election to the same post
in the future, and their actions while in oﬃce are used by voters in future elections to assess their
preferences and competence.
Following much of the literature, we estimate equations in which the policy variables are repre-
sented as functions of the timing of elections, as well as other controls. The basic relationship can
be written as:
fit = ai + b1fit−1 + b2fit−2 +
X
k
ckxk,it + d · elecdumit + εit (13)
where f is a ﬁscal policy variable, ai is a district eﬀect, the x are control variables, and i is an index
for the district. The variable elecdum, a political dummy which captures the timing of elections, is
the central variable of our analysis. It takes the value of one in periods preceding local elections, and
0 in all other periods. We time this dummy such that the pre-election period is the year previous
to the election if the election takes place in the ﬁrst half of the year, and the year of the election, if
the election is held in the second half. The autoregressive form is used in the literature on political
cycles as a parsimonious representation of policy choices. We include additional controls to account
f o ra sm u c hv a r i a b i l i t yi nt h ed a t aa sw ec a n .
We estimate a separate regression for (the log of) each type of government expenditure. That is,
11Alesina (2005) presents a number of studies of the political economy of Colombia which may serve as useful
background.
18each type of government expenditure is a diﬀerent f. In all regressions, we are interested in d,t h e
coeﬃc i e n tt h a tc a p t u r e st h ee ﬀect of elections. Of the 18 years in our sample, 6 are local election
years, when mayors, and city councils are elected. Elections occur at predetermined dates. Table 2
contains a list of elections held between 1987 and 2000.12
3.1.1 Data
We brieﬂy present now the data we use. A more detailed description can be found in Eslava (2004).
In terms of dependent variables, as mentioned above, we want to estimate 13 for diﬀerent compo-
nents of public expenditure. We use data from the Colombian Contraloría General, a public agency
with the task of monitoring public ﬁnances. Our data correspond to the ﬁgures in the ﬁnancial re-
port each municipality ﬁles with the Contraloría annually. The general structure of the expenditure
accounts, as well as basic statistics, are summarized in Table 1.
We estimate (13) using each of the expenditure categories mentioned in Table 1 as dependent
variables. That is, we run a separate regression for each category of spending. Besides the categories
listed in Table 1, we also examine investment in roads, which is a subcomponent of infrastructure
investment,13 and some subcomponents of personnel payments and current transfers. As mentioned
before, we expect to ﬁnd pre-election expansions in the components closely related to development
projects such as infrastructure, water, power and communications, and road construction.
For each type of expenditure, Figures 1a and 1b show mean values — in hundreds of thousands of
1998 pesos — for election and non-election years. Notice that in general current expenditure categories
have lower averages in election periods that in other periods. The opposite happens for investment
categories. While these observations suggest pre-election eﬀects in the direction we expect, more
systematic evidence is obtained by estimating equation (13).
One should note that “Current Transfers”, as deﬁn e di nt h eC o l o m b i a ng o v e r n m e n ta c c o u n t s ,
refer to beneﬁts to retired and temporary employees, and transfers to other levels of government,
groups that are unlikely to be the targets of election-year spending. They do not correspond to
the kind of transfers to speciﬁc groups that are often central to electoral manipulation. As argued
12Our period of estimation begins in 1987 because mayors are elected by popular vote only since 1988. However,
we have data on all variables starting in 1984. These additional observations allow us to estimate (13) in diﬀerences
and use lags of the regressors as instruments (see an explanation of estimation strategy below) without loosing
observations.
13“Infrastructure” includes, besides the construction of roads, urban infrastructure and construction of market
places.
19above, in the Colombian government accounts, election-year opportunistic spending is more likely
captured by some investment categories.
Table 3 lists the diﬀerent controls we use in alternative speciﬁcations. We use diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions, with alternative sets of controls, to analyze the robustness of our results. Our controls include
per capita GDP to account for economic activity, a time trend, and some social indicators that could
be used as inputs in ﬁscal policy decisions. The latter include population and a poverty indicator
known as “Unsatisﬁed Basic Needs”. We also use alternative ﬁnancial indicators as controls, trying
to account for some constraints faced by the government. These are particularly important in later
years, when the law has required that regional governments in Colombia obtain authorization from
the central level to increase expenditure if they have been running deﬁcits in previous years. We
use deﬁcit, debt, and ﬁscal dependence indicators, which we constructed by us from the Contraloría
data. The Fiscal Dependence indicator accounts for the degree of ﬁscal decentralization at the na-
tional level, which grew dramatically over this period. The indicator is increasing in the share of
revenues represented by transfers from the central government (as opposed to the local government’s
own ﬁscal eﬀort). We interact it with the trend variable, to diﬀerentiate the trend eﬀects related
to the process of ﬁscal decentralization from any other trend eﬀects. Finally, we include Incumbent
Advantage, measured by the percentage share of votes received by the incumbent in the last election.
We try to account in this way for the greater degrees of freedom that a popular incumbent has when
choosing ﬁscal policy.14
3.1.2 Estimation strategy
Given the presence of the city-speciﬁce ﬀects, ai, we estimate (13) in diﬀerences. Since this diﬀeren-
tiation introduces endogeneity problems, estimation is done by GMM15 using fi,t−s−1 and fi,t−s−2 to
14The GDP per capita data are from DANE (the Colombian Bureau of Statistics), while population and the
Unsatisﬁed Basic Needs indicator were provided by the University of Los Andes’ CEDE. Deﬁcit, Debt, and Fiscal
Dependence were constructed by us from the Contraloría data. As for Incumbent Advantage, we use electoral results
recorded in the National Planning Department Databases for the pre-1997 elections, while for 1997 and 2000 we use
oﬃcial results directly provided by the Registraduría Nacional. More details on the construction of all these controls
can be found in Eslava (2004).
15A detailed discussion of the endogeneity problems in this estimation, as well as the virtues of the estimation
technique used can be found in Eslava (2004). It should be noted that the most widely used methodology in this
literature is the one suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). We do not use this approach because, with the relatively
large numbers of periods (15) and endogenous variables (up to 5) in our estimations, the Arellano-Bond estimation
contains more than 60 instruments. GMM estimators with such a large number of overidentifying restrictions are
known to have poor ﬁnite sample properties. Our results are, however, robust to the use of Arellano-Bond techniques,
although the set of instruments does not perform as well as under the methodology we use here. Results of Arellano-
20instrument for the ∆fi,t−s = fi,t−s −fi,t−s−1,a n dxi,t−s−1 and xi,t−s−2 to instrument for the ∆xi,t−s.
The following sequential endogeneity constraints guarantee the validity of these instruments:
E(εitfit−s)=0for all t and for s ≥ 1
The electoral dummy is assumed strictly exogenous with respect to the error term, since the timing
of elections is pre-determined in Colombia. That is,
E(εitelecdumiv)=0for all v,t
Other controls are in general assumed to be sequentially exogenous, although some of them may
be contemporaneously correlated with the error term.16 The general assumptions are:
E(εitxit−w)=0for all t and for w ≥ a
where a =0for control variables assumed not contemporaneously correlated with the error term,
and a =1for the opposite case.
3.1.3 Results
Results for the political dummy d in which we are interested are presented in Table 4.17 In the table,
each of columns (1) through (4) represents a diﬀerent set of controls, as detailed in Table 3. Each
row corresponds to a diﬀerent regression, with the dependent variable for each regression given in
the ﬁrst column. For instance, the ﬁrst row reports the estimate of d when the dependent variable
is the log of current expenditure. (All dependent variables are expressed in logs.) Results in bold
letters are signiﬁcant at the 5% level, in bold and italics signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Results point to an election-year change in the composition of spending in the expected direction.
We observe a decrease in some current expenditures before elections, speciﬁcally transfers to retirees,
payments to temporary workers, and payments of debt service. Concurrent with this contraction
Bond estimations of our model are presented brieﬂy in Eslava (2004).
16Incumbent advantage, the time trend, the ﬁscal dependence indicator (since it is an aggregate-level indicator),
and previous year’s deﬁcit and debt are all assumed contemporaneously exogenous with respect to the error term.
The rest of controls are assumed potentially correlated with the contemporaneous error term.
17To facilitate reading, estimates for other coeﬃcients are not reported. All other results are available from the
authors upon request, and some of them are reported in Eslava(2004).
21we ﬁnd an increase of spending in development projects. In particular, total investment and its sub-
categories infrastructure, power and road construction all show pre-election increases. Interestingly,
payments to permanent workers appear to increase prior to elections.18 These changes in spending
are not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also large in size. For instance, current transfers fall close to
30% and interest payments close to 10%, while total investment rises about 15% before elections.19
A similar message emerges if the dependent variables are the shares of total expenditure repre-
sented by each category (Table 5). While the fraction of current expenditures and interest payments
in total spending decreases before elections, the opposite occurs with investment. The reduction
of current spending is explained mainly by lower transfers to retirees and payments to temporary
workers. On the other hand, the investment category that rises before elections is infrastructure,
including road construction, and construction of power and water plants.
In summary, we ﬁnd that before elections the composition of local government expenditures
changes in a systematic way. There is a shift of resources away from what we believe to be less
popular types of spending into development projects, which may represent spending clearly targeted
to voters. One is then led to ask whether such compositional changes actually change voting patterns
in favor of the incumbent. We now turn to empirical evidence on the link between the government’s
budget and election outcomes.
3.2 Voting
Our approach has two broad implications about voter response to electoral ﬁscal policy. First (which
is actually an assumption), voters dislike deﬁcits. Second, and most importantly, diﬀerent categories
of spending have diﬀerential eﬀects on voting, with the incumbent deriving the most electoral beneﬁt
from “targeted” expenditures. In this section, we address these points empirically.
18The ﬁnding of a pre-electoral expansion of personnel expenditures would be consistent with the widespread idea
that politicians in Colombia trade government jobs in exchange for political support.
19Table 4 does not include the eﬀect on total spending. The reason is that the model presented above makes no
prediction regarding total expenditure. In this approach, the eﬀect on total spending is seen simply as the sum of
what happens to individual categories. It is worth mentioning, however, that by estimating (13) with f equal to
the log of total expenditure, one obtains a very small pre-electoral eﬀect. Although in speciﬁcations 1 and 3 it is
statistically signiﬁcant, it is only approximately 3%. Moreover, in speciﬁcations 2 and 4 it is not even statistically
signiﬁcant.
223.2.1 Data
The relevant deﬁnition of “incumbent” for the Colombian case is the incumbent party, since oﬃcials
cannot run for direct re-election. We therefore use data on the share of votes obtained by each party
in local mayoral elections from 1992 to 2000 (four elections).20
Politics in Colombia have been traditionally dominated by two major parties, Liberal and Con-
servative. While some candidates, particularly in the 1990’s, ran under the banner of a myriad
of diﬀerent parties or political movements, many of these movements can be traced back to the
traditional parties, and voters in each locality are frequently aware of those ties. In that sense,
elections are still mainly a contest between these two major parties, although there are also two
smaller left-wing parties and some truly independent political groups.
Given these political groupings, one challenge in the data is to identify which candidates are
associated with one of the major parties, in order to calculate the appropriate shares of party votes.
We use information from external sources to match the diﬀerent movements with the traditional
party division between Liberals and Conservatives. Movements that were not successfully linked to
one of the main parties are considered “independents” in our analysis. We calculate the share of
votes obtained by the Liberal party, for example, as the sum of the shares obtained by all the smaller
organizations linked to the Liberal party. It is important to highlight that there is measurement error
due to the diﬃculty in identifying some matches (in particular, some organizations linked to one of
the parties may have been mistakenly assigned as independents). More details on the construction
of these linkages can be found in Eslava (2004).
3.2.2 The eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on vote shares
Vote shares are modeled as a function of the ﬁscal choices of the incumbent party in the pre-election
p e r i o d . F o l l o w i n gt h el i t e r a t u r eo nv o t e r sa sﬁscal conservatives (e.g., Peltzman [1992], Brender
[2003]), we consider the eﬀect of deﬁcits on vote shares. We also attempt to distinguish the eﬀects
of diﬀerent spending categories, given that our theoretical results suggest that voters see targeted
expenditures diﬀerently than the rest of spending. Following the previous discussion, we treat
investment spending as targeted expenditure, and current spending as non-targeted expenditure.
20Unfortunately, for previous elections only the share of votes obtained by the winner of the election is available,
so that full party shares cannot be calculated.
23We run a regression of the following form:
votespis = α0 + α1votespis−1 + α2investis + α3currentis + α4deficitis + α5gris (14)
+( β2investis + β3currentis + β4deficitis + β5gris) ∗ incpis−1 + visp
The time indices, s, refer to election periods, so that s is the current election and s − 1 the
previous election. votespis is the share (in percentages) of votes obtained by party p in city i in the
election at s.T h eﬁscal variables correspond to the election year (as deﬁned above); we include the
log of per capita investment spending (investis), the log of per capita current spending (currentis),
and the per capita government deﬁcit (deficitit). The discrete variable incpis−1 takes a value of 1 if
the party p is in power before the election, and 0 otherwise. Average GDP growth between t−1 and
t (grit) is also considered to control for other observables that may aﬀect voters’ perceptions about
the incumbent. The direction of the results reported below is robust to changing the speciﬁcation to
one that restricts the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on the votes received by the incumbent to be the negative
of its eﬀect on the votes received by the challenger (see Eslava [2004]).
We interpret the coeﬃcients β2,β3,β4 as reﬂecting the advantage (or disadvantage) the incum-
bent obtains with respect to the challenger for increasing investment, current spending or the deﬁcit
before the election. Under the assumption that vitp c a p t u r e st h ep a r to fv o t i n gb e h a v i o rt h a tt h e
politician cannot predict, ﬁscal policy decisions cannot be based on those innovations, and the policy
variables included in the regression should satisfy the restriction of being orthogonal to the error
term. Assuming that there are no components of vit that aﬀect the incumbent’s ﬁscal choices may
indeed be strong, but data restrictions make addressing these concerns a quite diﬃcult task, beyond
the scope of this paper.
Results are reported in Table 6; column (1) reports estimates of (14), while column (2) reports
results of a slightly modiﬁed version that includes party/state eﬀects.21 Robust standard errors
are reported below the point estimates. Column (3) reports results of speciﬁcation (14), but the
spending variable invest is measured as a fraction of total spending (in this case, the corresponding
fraction for current spending is not included in the speciﬁcation due to concerns about collinearity
of the regressors).
21Af u l lﬁxed-eﬀects version cannot be used due to restrictions of the voting shares data: for most localities we
have no more than 1 usable observation.
24As previous studies have found for other countries (e.g. Peltzman [1992] for the U.S., Brender
[2003] for Israel, Brender and Drazen [2005] for developed countries in general), and contrary to
the implicit view in much of the empirical literature on political budget cycles, the results indicate
that Colombian voters penalize the incumbent party for running high deﬁcits. Furthermore, high
capital expenditures (interpreted here as targeted spending) increase the share of votes obtained by
the incumbent party relative to the challenger, while current (“non-targeted”) expenditure has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect.22 From column (3), for instance, a ten percent increase in the share of spending
dedicated to investment increases the fraction of votes obtained by the incumbent party by about
1%, while a two standard deviation increase in the deﬁcit per capita decreases the share of votes
to the incumbent party by close to 4.2%. These results are consistent with the view that voters
dislike incumbents who run high deﬁcits, while they value speciﬁc types of expenditures. They are
also consistent with the results on electoral changes in the composition of spending discussed above
which show incumbents increasing targeted spending before the elections, while they try to avoid
concomitant increases in the overall budget.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a view of the Political Budget Cycle in which voters may dislike ﬁscal deﬁcits,
even though they value government spending on some speciﬁc types of goods. Politicians are aware
of voter preferences (which may diﬀer from their own), and hence electoral manipulation of the
budget takes the form of a change in the composition of expenditure from less to more targeted
spending, rather than an increase in the overall size of the budget. We present a model with
perfectly rational, forward-looking voters, who use the provision of public goods to make inferences
about the incumbent’s ﬁscal preferences. Election-year shifts of the budget improve the incumbent’s
chances of being re-elected, since voters assign some probability that more targeted spending reﬂects
a the incumbent’s true preference for types of spending voters prefer, rather than purely electoral
incentives.
The predictions of our model are shown to be consistent with evidence on the composition
of public spending and the behavior of voters in Colombian municipalities. We ﬁnd that, prior
22Tests of joint signiﬁcance indicate that α2 +β2 (the "absolute" eﬀect of investment on the share of votes received
by the incumbent) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, α3 +β3 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, and α4 +β4 is
negative and signiﬁcant.
25to elections, some components of spending that we believe are particularly attractive to voters
expand signiﬁcantly. These components are infrastructure spending, including road construction
and construction of power and water plants. On the other hand, interest payments, transfers to
retirees, and payments to temporary workers contract in election years. We also ﬁnd that voters
penalize the incumbent party for running large deﬁcits before elections, and reward it for increasing
the amount of targeted spending observed before the election.
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27Type of Expenditure
Number of  obs.
 Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Total Expenditure 12,335                     56,458           611,226    
1. Current Expenditure 12,334                     19,856           185,433    
     1.1. General Payments 12,265                     4,068             21,005      
     1.2. Personnel Exp. 12,266                     9,759             82,677      
     1.3. Current Transfers 12,247                     5,895             91,341      
2. Investment 12,335                     30,129           382,126    
     2.1. Infrastructure 5,276                       3,173             8,252        
     2.2. Water, Energy, and 
Comunications 5,571                       3,707             6,166        
     2.3. Housing 7,365                       761                4,069        
     2.4. Education 7,469                       3,615             5,523        
     2.5. Health 7,469                       2,710             5,007        
     2.6. Other
3. Debt service 12,186                     6,554             70,578      
All measures in hundreds of pesos of 1998






























































































































T(t) x x x x
y(i,t-1) x x x x
log_GDP_PC(i,t-1) x x x x
log_UBN(i,t-1) x x x x
log_POPULATION(i,t-1) x x x x
DEFICIT(i,t-1) x x
DEBT_84(i,t-1) x
T*FISCAL_DEP(t) x x x
VOTE SHARE(i, prev.elect) x














Dependent Variable: Type of 
expenditure
123 4
1. Current Expenditure -0.024 -0.033 -0.011 -0.041
(0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023)
1.1. General Payments 0.037 0.025 0.031 0.032
(0.027) (0.043) (0.041) (0.051)
1.2. Personnel Expenditure 0.071 0.082 0.087 0.084
(0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022)
     1.2.1 Personnel Temporary -0.546 -0.371 -0.303 -0.369
(0.252) (0.106) (0.100) (0.109)
1.3. Current Transfers -0.222 -0.369 -0.270 -0.332
(0.082) (0.101) (0.078) (0.123)
      1.3.1 Transfers to retired -0.977 -0.826 -1.236 -0.659
                       workers (0.470) (0.437) (0.575) (0.396)
      1.3.2.  Other Transfers 0.043 0.324 0.247 0.398
(0.125) (0.159) (0.150) (0.162)
2. Investment 0.142 0.126 0.144 0.122
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
2.1. Infrastructure 0.436 0.452 0.507 0.376
(0.072) (0.077) (0.098) (0.083)
          2.1.1. Roads 0.365 0.392 0.412 0.318
(0.069) (0.076) (0.074) (0.078)
2.2. Water, Energy, and Com. 0.219 0.168 0.193 0.177
(0.065) (0.072) (0.077) (0.075)
2.3. Housing 0.124 0.028 0.100 0.432
(0.207) (0.232) (0.228) (0.212)
2.4. Education 0.110 0.083 0.090 0.090
(0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
2.5. Health 0.084 0.097 0.079 0.128
(0.054) (0.064) (0.061) (0.070)
3. Debt Service -0.053 -0.082 -0.104 -0.090
(0.031) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
This is a GMM estimation of equation 13. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Estimate is significant at 5% level if in bold characters, at 10% if in bold and italics.
Each row corresponds to a different regression, where the dependent variable is 
the level of expenditure in each category.
Each column corresponds to a different set of controls, as detailed in table 2




 Dependent Variable: Type of 
expenditure
1234
1. Current Expenditure -0.088 -0.081 -0.070 -0.079
(0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
1.1. General Payments -0.041 -0.001 0.006 0.016
(0.031) (0.043) (0.045) (0.051)
1.2. Personnel Expenditure 0.038 0.037 0.061 0.038
(0.018) (0.032) (0.028) (0.035)
     1.2.1 Personnel Temporary -0.466 -0.319 -0.206 -0.321
(0.282) (0.159) (0.146) (0.160)
1.3. Current Transfers -0.286 -0.444 -0.356 -0.418
(0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.082)
      1.3.1 Transfers to retired -0.978 -0.849 -1.501 -0.688
                       workers (0.508) (0.403) (0.591) (0.364)
      1.3.2.  Other Transfers -0.060 0.277 0.183 0.347
(0.118) (0.162) (0.147) (0.163)
2. Investment 0.106 0.075 0.081 0.080
(0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
2.1. Infrastructure 0.421 0.413 0.382 0.361
(0.087) (0.097) (0.107) (0.117)
          2.1.1. Roads 0.401 0.377 0.394 0.350
(0.065) (0.074) (0.066) (0.085)
2.2. Water, Energy, and Com. 0.187 0.138 0.142 0.166
(0.074) (0.081) (0.074) (0.086)
2.3. Housing 0.032 -0.076 -0.006 0.304
(0.201) (0.224) (0.222) (0.195)
2.4. Education 0.037 0.004 0.003 0.018
(0.034) (0.046) (0.040) (0.046)
2.5. Health 0.018 0.012 -0.019 0.047
(0.067) (0.069) (0.062) (0.065)
3. Debt Service -0.104 -0.121 -0.102 -0.123
(0.037) (0.046) (0.043) (0.054)
This is a GMM estimation of equation 13. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Estimate is significant at 5% level if in bold characters, at 10% if in bold and italics.
Each row corresponds to a different regression, where the dependent variable is 
the share of total expenditure represented by a given category.
Each column corresponds to a different set of controls, as detailed in table 2
Effect of elections on the composition of total expenditure (shares)
Table 5.
 
 Dependent Variable:            
Votes to party P
Investment as 
share of total
Regressor 1 2 3
Constant 29.663 - 29.232
(2.224) (1.978)
Votes to P in past election 0.498 0.389 0.524
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Deficit 0.026 0.025 0.024
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
Deficit * incumbent -0.049 -0.047 -0.040
(0.023) (0.022) (0.019)
Investment Expenditure -3.224 -0.493 -4.281
(1.494) (1.134) (2.455)
Investment Expenditure 5.904 3.290 9.887
*incumbent (1.719) (1.439) (2.970)
Current Expenditure -1.571 0.119 -
(1.784) (1.380)
Current Expenditure 2.163 -1.730 -
*incumbent (1.732) (1.339)
GDP Growth 133.971 74.783 121.765
(30.768) (24.054) (30.898)
GDP growth*incumbent -77.723 10.960 -61.450
(36.029) (28.116) (36.249)
Observations 2032 2032 2032
R-square 0.234 0.196 0.232
Notes: this table presents the results of estimating equation 17
Bold characters denote significance at 5%. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Columns 1 and 3 report Pooled OLS results, Column 2 reports OLS results with state/party effects
Incumbent is 1 if party P is in power at the time of the election, 0 otherwise
Expenditure variables in per 
capita terms
Table 6. Effect of fiscal performance on vote shares
 
 
 
 
 
 
 